Chapter 3 — New Centres Of Power

Fig 1 — Educational Diagram: End of the Cold War and changing power structure

Overview: The end of the Cold War (late 1980s–1991) transformed global politics from a bipolar contest between the USA and the USSR into a period of changing power centres. The collapse of the Soviet bloc removed the main ideological and military rivalry, producing an era of US predominance (a "unipolar moment") followed by a gradual diffusion of power to new state and non‑state actors.

How the Cold War ended (key processes/causes): Economic stagnation and systemic inefficiencies in the USSR; political and economic reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev (Perestroika and Glasnost); rising costs of the arms race; weakening control over Eastern Europe; popular movements and revolutions in 1989 (Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary); the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989); the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow and formal dissolution of the USSR in December 1991.

Immediate consequences: End of bipolar structure; collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe; German reunification; withdrawal of Soviet forces from overseas client states; sharp decline in ideological confrontation but rise in ethnic and regional conflicts in some post‑Soviet spaces.

Changing power structure — main features:

• Shift from bipolarity to unipolarity and then evolving multipolarity: The 1990s saw US dominance in military, political and economic terms (e.g., Gulf War 1991). Over subsequent decades power began to diffuse as other actors (China, EU, India, regional powers) grew.
• Economic rather than purely military measures of power: Rapid economic growth (especially in East and South Asia) reshaped influence; trade, investment and tech became key instruments of power.
• Rise of regional and new global centres: The European Union as a collective actor, China’s rise, India’s emergence, a reassertive Russia, Brazil and other regional powers.
• Proliferation and diffusion of power: Nuclear and missile technologies spread; transnational corporations, global finance and information networks became powerful actors.
• Increasing importance of soft power and normative institutions: Culture, diplomacy, development assistance, international institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank, UN) and norms gained greater relevance.
• Role of non‑state actors: Terrorist networks, multinational corporations, NGOs and global civil society began to affect international decisions (e.g., 9/11, global climate movements).

Implications for international politics: New security complexities (asymmetric warfare, terrorism, cyber threats); regional rivalries and realignments (NATO expansion, China‑US competition in Asia); changing nature of alliances (issue‑based coalitions rather than rigid blocs); increased economic interdependence but also strategic competition in trade and technology.

Impact on India and developing countries: Economic liberalization in India (1991) was partly driven by the new global environment; India’s regional and global ambitions grew (economic reforms, nuclear tests in 1998, greater diplomatic engagement). Many developing states gained new space to pursue non‑aligned or multi‑aligned policies, entering regional groupings (SAARC, ASEAN dialogues, BRICS).

Contemporary trend: The 21st century shows movement toward multipolarity: China’s economic and military rise, the EU’s regulatory and normative influence, India’s growing role, and the persistent—but transformed—role of the US and Russia. New domains (cyberspace, outer space, economic statecraft) are central to power projection.

Summary: The end of the Cold War dismantled the bipolar world and created a dynamic, multi‑dimensional structure of power where economic capability, technology, soft power, regional leadership and non‑state actors matter alongside traditional military strength.

Fig 2 — Educational Diagram: Emergence of new centres of power

What it means
"Emergence of new centres of power" refers to the shift away from a unipolar or bipolar international order toward a more plural (multipolar) world in which several states and non-state actors possess significant economic, military, technological and normative influence. New centres alter global decision-making, norms and alliances.

Causes / Drivers
1) Economic growth: Rapid rises in GDP, industrialization and trade integration (e.g., China, India) increase material capabilities.
2) Technological leadership: Dominance in digital platforms, AI, telecoms and critical supply chains creates strategic leverage.
3) Military-modernization and power projection: Increased defence spending, new bases and advanced capabilities change regional balances.
4) Globalization and interdependence: Greater trade, investment and transnational networks decentralize influence.
5) Institutional change and grouping: New institutions (BRICS Bank), expanded forums (G20) and regional integration (EU, ASEAN) create alternative governance centres.
6) Non-state actors: Multinational corporations, global cities, NGOs, and transnational movements exercise political and economic power.

Features and patterns
- Multipolarity: Power is distributed among several actors rather than dominated by one.
- Issue-specific leadership: Different actors lead on different issues (e.g., tech norms vs. climate finance).
- Networked power: Influence flows through trade, investment, digital platforms and institutions rather than only military force.
- Competition and cooperation: New centres both cooperate (trade, institutions) and compete (regional influence, norms).

Implications
- Foreign policy becomes more regionalized and flexible; shifting alliances and balancing strategies increase.
- Governance gaps and norm contestation: Competing visions of trade rules, internet governance, human rights and development finance arise.
- Economic and security interdependencies complicate conflict management: sanctions, supply‑chain measures and technological decoupling become tools.
- Opportunities for middle powers and regional organisations to shape outcomes.

How to study it
Examine measurable indicators (GDP, trade share, military expenditure, patent output, FDI flows) and qualitative evidence (institutional initiatives, diplomatic reach, soft power campaigns). Compare changes over time and across regions to identify emerging centres.

Fig 3 — Educational Diagram: International economic institutions and new governance

What they are: International economic institutions are multilateral organizations, agreements and networks (for example, the IMF, World Bank, WTO, G20, regional development banks, credit-rating agencies and regulatory bodies) that shape rules, finance, surveillance and coordination of the global economy. “New governance” refers to the shift from purely state-centred rule-making to a mixed system where states, international organisations, transnational corporations, NGOs, expert networks and market actors share rule-setting, implementation and enforcement.

Main functions:

• Rule-making: establishing trade, finance and investment norms (WTO agreements, bilateral investment treaties, Basel capital rules).
• Surveillance and monitoring: assessing macroeconomic policies and financial stability (IMF Article IV, OECD peer reviews).
• Finance and insurance: lending for balance-of-payments or development (IMF loans, World Bank and regional development bank projects).
• Dispute settlement and enforcement: resolving trade and investment disputes (WTO Dispute Settlement Body).
• Technical assistance and capacity-building: helping countries design and implement policies.
• Coordination and crisis management: aligning policy responses across countries (G20 coordination during the 2008 crisis).

How “new governance” works in practice: New governance uses a mix of hard law (binding treaties, adjudicated rulings) and soft law (guidelines, codes, peer review). It relies on networks (central-bank networks implementing Basel standards), public–private partnerships (infrastructure financing), and non-state actors (rating agencies, certification bodies, NGOs). Decision-making is often polycentric — influence flows through formal votes, informal leadership, economic leverage (trade, investment), and expertise.

Impacts and tensions: International institutions can promote stability, growth and predictability by reducing transaction costs and resolving disputes. But they also raise tensions: conditionality and policy prescriptions can limit national policy space; governance gaps and democratic deficits create legitimacy concerns; rules may favour powerful states or global capital, producing uneven development.

Contemporary trends: rise of alternative institutions (BRICS’ New Development Bank, China-led AIIB), greater role of financial markets and rating agencies, stronger regulatory cooperation (Basel III), increased use of soft-law instruments, and multi-stakeholder governance (public–private partnerships for infrastructure and health).

Key takeaways: International economic institutions are central to the new governance of the global economy because they create rules, provide finance and coordinate policy — but their authority is layered, contested, and increasingly shared with non-state actors. Understanding their role requires analysing both formal mandates and informal levers of power (economic size, market access, knowledge and networks).

Fig 4 — Educational Diagram: Globalisation and interdependence

What is globalisation? Globalisation is the process by which states, economies, societies and cultures become integrated through cross-border flows of goods, services, capital, people, information and ideas. It is driven by technological advances, trade and investment liberalisation, growth of multinational corporations, and policy choices that reduce barriers to exchange.

What is interdependence? Interdependence refers to mutual reliance between actors (states, firms, societies) such that actions or shocks in one part affect others. In a globalised world interdependence becomes multidimensional: economic, political, technological, cultural and ecological.

How the two relate: Globalisation increases the volume, speed and complexity of cross-border interactions; interdependence is the structural consequence — the degree to which actors depend on one another. Greater global integration usually raises interdependence, making cooperation and coordination more important while also increasing vulnerability to distant shocks.

Key dimensions:

• Economic: Trade, cross-border investment (FDI), global supply chains, banking linkages.
• Political: International institutions (UN, WTO, IMF, G20), diplomatic networks, treaty regimes.
• Technological and informational: Internet, telecommunications, data flows, cyber-dependence.
• Cultural: Migration, media, education and lifestyle diffusion.
• Ecological: Climate change, biodiversity loss, pandemics — problems that cross borders and require global cooperation.

Causes/drivers: falling transport and communication costs, trade/liberalisation policies, growth of MNCs, digital technologies, policy choices promoting mobility of capital and goods.

Consequences — benefits: higher global output and growth, technology transfer, consumer choice, access to capital, specialization and efficiency from comparative advantage, poverty reduction in some countries.

Consequences — costs and challenges: greater vulnerability to external shocks (financial crises, supply-chain disruptions), uneven distribution of gains (inequality), erosion of policy autonomy, cultural homogenisation, regulatory arbitrage by firms, environmental pressures.

Policy responses: multilateral cooperation (WTO rules, climate agreements), regional integration (EU, ASEAN), domestic social policies to manage adjustment, reshoring or diversification of critical supply chains, and global governance reforms to handle taxation, labor and environmental standards.

Important to remember: Globalisation is not one-way progress; it is contested. Interdependence can be asymmetric (one actor more dependent than the other), which creates leverage and potential conflict. Effective management of interdependence requires shared institutions, transparent rules and mechanisms for redistribution and burden-sharing.

Fig 5 — Educational Diagram: Rise of non-state actors

Definition: Non-state actors (NSAs) are individuals or organizations that hold influence in international or domestic politics but are not sovereign states. They include multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational advocacy networks, insurgent and terrorist groups, private military companies, diasporas, media corporations, and cyber collectives.

Why NSAs have risen:

• Globalization: Increased cross-border trade, capital flows and interdependence allow actors beyond states to operate transnationally.
• Technological change: Communications, social media and cyber tools amplify voices, organize movements, enable asymmetric warfare and spread information quickly.
• Privatization and market power: Growth of large corporations gives them economic clout, market control and political leverage.
• Transnational problems: Issues like climate change, migration, pandemics and human rights require expertise and networks often provided by NGOs and scientific communities.
• Weak or contested state authority: In failed or fragile states, armed groups, criminal networks and private military firms fill governance gaps.
• Normative and legitimacy resources: NGOs and advocacy networks build moral authority that can constrain or shape state behaviour.

Roles and modes of influence:

• Economic leverage: MNCs influence policy via investment decisions, lobbying, and controlling essential goods/services.
• Information and agenda-setting: Media firms, social platforms and advocacy groups set public agendas and shape perceptions.
• Provision of services: NGOs, faith-based groups and private firms deliver humanitarian aid, health and infrastructure, often in place of the state.
• Security and coercion: Militias, terrorist groups and private security contractors exercise violence and can alter political outcomes.
• Norm entrepreneurship: Transnational advocacy networks and expert communities create new norms (e.g., human rights, environmental standards).

Consequences (positive and negative):

• Positive: Increased expertise and service delivery, innovation, diffusion of norms (human rights, environmental standards), enhanced transnational cooperation.
• Negative: Erosion of state authority, unaccountable private power, rise of transnational crime and terrorism, misinformation, regulatory gaps and unequal accountability.

State responses and governance challenges: States regulate and partner with NSAs (public–private partnerships, NGO accreditation, corporate regulation), but face challenges in legitimacy, accountability and enforcing laws across borders. Effective global governance increasingly requires hybrid arrangements that include state and non-state actors.

Conclusion: The rise of non-state actors reflects structural shifts in the international system—economic interdependence, technological diffusion and transnational problems. NSAs can complement states but also complicate sovereignty, accountability and security, making them central actors in contemporary world politics.

Fig 6 — Educational Diagram: New security challenges

Definition and context: "New security challenges" refers to the shift from a mainly state‑centric, military understanding of security to a multidimensional concept that includes non‑military, transnational and non‑state threats. Since the end of the Cold War and especially in the 21st century, threats such as terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, climate change, economic vulnerability and space/technological competition have become central to national and international security agendas.

Key characteristics:

• Multidimensional: security now spans military, political, economic, environmental, health and technological domains.
• Transnational and cross‑border: many threats (e.g., pandemics, cybercrime, climate impacts) ignore state borders and require international cooperation.
• Non‑state actors and asymmetric threats: terrorist groups, criminal networks, hacktivists and private tech firms play major roles.
• Technological acceleration: cyber operations, artificial intelligence (AI), drones and space capabilities introduce new vulnerabilities and uncertainties.
• Blurring of internal/external security: internal instability (e.g., civil unrest, economic crises) has international consequences, and vice versa.

Main categories of new security challenges:

• Cybersecurity and information warfare: attacks on critical infrastructure, data theft, ransomware, disinformation campaigns and election interference.
• Terrorism and violent extremism: transnational terrorist networks, lone‑actor attacks and online radicalization.
• Proliferation and new military domains: nuclear and missile proliferation; militarization of space; development of anti‑satellite (ASAT) weapons and hypersonic missiles.
• Hybrid and gray‑zone warfare: combination of military, cyber, economic and informational tools below the threshold of open war (e.g., covert operations, proxies).
• Environmental and resource security: climate change, water stress, desertification and competition over resources that can drive migration and conflict.
• Economic security and supply‑chain vulnerability: dependence on single suppliers, sanctions, trade wars and financial contagion affecting national stability.
• Health security: pandemics and health system collapse that affect defence, economy and social order.

Implications for policy and strategy:

• Move from purely military solutions to comprehensive approaches combining diplomacy, development, law enforcement, public health, and intelligence.
• Greater emphasis on resilience: protecting critical infrastructure, diversifying supply chains, emergency preparedness and societal cohesion.
• Need for international cooperation and norms (e.g., cyber norms, arms control, climate agreements) while managing great‑power competition.
• Investment in technology, regulation of emerging tech (AI, biotech), and capacity building for detection and response.

How states respond: typical responses include strengthening cyber defences, intelligence sharing, multilateral treaties and forums, public health systems, climate adaptation measures, and legal frameworks for counterterrorism and cybercrime. Many countries adopt smart power strategies that combine hard (military) and soft (diplomatic, economic, normative) instruments.

Summary: New security challenges require holistic, multi‑sectoral and cooperative responses. They change how we define national interest, prioritize resources and create alliances — moving security beyond armies and borders to systems, networks and societies.

Fig 7 — Educational Diagram: Global governance and institutional reform

What is global governance? Global governance refers to the rules, institutions and processes—formal (e.g., UN, IMF, WTO) and informal (e.g., G20, BRICS)—through which states and other actors manage common global problems (security, trade, finance, environment, health).

Why institutional reform is needed: The post‑1945 institutional architecture reflects a world in which Western powers dominated. Since the late 20th century the international distribution of power has changed: rapid economic growth and political influence of countries such as China, India, Brazil and others (the ‘‘new centres of power’’) have made many institutions seem unrepresentative, reduce their legitimacy and limit their effectiveness. Key problems include (a) under‑representation of emerging economies, (b) decision‑making dominated by a few (vetoes, weighted votes), (c) slow adaptation to new global issues, and (d) gaps in enforcement and accountability.

Main areas and forms of reform:

• Representation and membership — e.g., expanding membership of the UN Security Council, including permanent or semi‑permanent seats for emerging powers, or regional representation.
• Voting rules and quotas — reforming IMF/World Bank quota and voting shares to reflect current GDP and financial contributions.
• Decision‑making methods — reducing unanimity requirements, increasing qualified majority voting in some bodies, or using rotating seats.
• Creation of new institutions & coalitions — when reform is blocked, states form new fora (e.g., G20, BRICS New Development Bank) to reflect new realities.
• Norms and procedures — strengthening transparency, compliance mechanisms, and accountability (e.g., WHO reforms after pandemics).

Principles for good reform: legitimacy (fair representation), effectiveness (capacity to act), accountability (to states and people), transparency, and flexibility to address novel problems.

Obstacles to reform: entrenched interests of dominant states (which benefit from status quo), institutional inertia, differing priorities between Global North and South, concerns about sovereignty, and technical/legal hurdles (amending charters).

How reforms happen in practice: through negotiated amendments (e.g., IMF quota changes), political bargains (ad hoc coalitions like G20), or creation of parallel institutions (e.g., BRICS Bank). Some reforms are incremental and technical; others require major political shifts.

Connection to Class 12 theme: ‘‘New centres of power’’ shows how the rise of emerging powers pressures existing institutions to change or gives rise to alternative institutions. Global governance reforms are the political and institutional responses to shifting power.

Fig 8 — Educational Diagram: Implications for developing countries and India

Overview: The rise of new centres of power — notably China but also regional powers and multilateral initiatives (AIIB, New Development Bank/BRICS Bank, expanding regional blocs) — shifts global economic, political and strategic balances. For developing countries and India this creates both opportunities (investment, markets, alternatives to Western-dominated institutions) and risks (geopolitical competition, dependency, policy constraints).

Main implications:

• Economic opportunities: Greater foreign direct investment (FDI), infrastructure finance, market access and integration into global value chains as new powers and regional institutions offer alternatives to traditional lenders. This can accelerate growth, industrialisation and job creation if paired with good governance and capacity-building.
• Strategic freedom and hedging: Developing states can pursue multi-alignment — engaging multiple great powers to maximise benefits and preserve autonomy. India’s policy of strategic autonomy and participation in groups like the Quad, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation exemplify hedging.
• Policy space and conditionalities: New lenders often attach different conditionalities than Western institutions. This may increase policy space in the short run but can also create new dependencies (e.g., project procurement, tied finance) and governance challenges.
• Geopolitical risk and instability: Competition between major powers (trade wars, sanctions, military rivalry) can spill over to developing countries through supply-chain disruption, trade diversion, or pressure to choose sides.
• Infrastructure and connectivity: Large-scale connectivity projects (rail, ports, energy corridors) can transform productivity and regional trade. They can also raise concerns about debt sustainability, environmental and social impacts, and local governance if projects lack transparency.
• Institutional alternatives and reform pressure: The growth of alternative institutions (AIIB, NDB, regional development banks) offers financing choices and pressures traditional institutions (IMF/World Bank) to reform representation and lending practices, potentially improving access for developing countries.
• Technology, standards and norms: Competition shapes digital, telecom and technology standards (5G, data rules, AI governance). Developing countries must choose standards and regulatory frameworks that affect future competitiveness, privacy and security.
• Social and distributional impacts: Benefits from new investments may be uneven, creating winners and losers domestically. This heightens the need for redistributive policies and skill-development to avoid rising inequality and social unrest.

Specific implications for India:

• Economic leverage and market access: India can attract manufacturing relocation as firms diversify supply chains away from China (post-COVID de-risking and trade tensions). Government initiatives like "Make in India" and production-linked incentives aim to capture this opportunity.
• Diplomatic balancing: India must balance deep economic ties with China and the US. It has increased partnerships with the US, Japan and Australia (Quad), engaged with the EU, and retained membership in BRICS and SCO to maintain strategic options.
• Infrastructure finance and partnerships: India benefits from diversified sources (multilateral banks, bilateral lines, domestic debt) but remains cautious about projects that might compromise sovereignty or create unsustainable debt (e.g., close monitoring of Chinese-funded projects).
• Technology and standards: India faces choices on telecom (5G), digital governance and data rules. Aligning with global standards while protecting local interests (data localisation, cybersecurity) is critical for digital sovereignty.
• Regional leadership and connectivity: India has opportunities to lead regional integration (SAARC alternatives, BIMSTEC, Act East policy) and to offer alternatives in development cooperation — e.g., concessional lines of credit, capacity-building in neighbouring countries.
• Domestic reforms required: To convert geopolitical openings into sustainable development, India must continue reforms: infrastructure, regulatory clarity, labour and land reforms, education and skilling, fiscal consolidation and ease of doing business improvements.

Policy guidance for developing countries and India:

• Diversify economic and security partnerships to avoid overdependence on a single power.
• Strengthen domestic institutions, transparency and debt-management frameworks to negotiate better finance terms.
• Invest in human capital and infrastructure to capture higher-value segments of global value chains.
• Adopt clear regulatory frameworks for technology, data and investment to protect sovereignty while attracting investment.
• Use multilateral forums and regional integration to amplify bargaining power and push for reforms in global governance.

Conclusion: The emergence of new centres of power reshapes choices available to developing countries and India. The outcome depends on how effectively states manage opportunities (investment, markets, partnerships) while mitigating risks (debt, dependency, geopolitical pressure) through diversification, institutional strengthening and domestic reforms.

Fig 9 — Educational Diagram: Concepts and theoretical frameworks

Overview: This topic introduces the main concepts and theoretical frameworks used to analyse how power is produced, distributed and exercised in the contemporary international system and how new centres of power (states, groups, and non-state actors) emerge.

Key concepts:

• Power — the ability to influence outcomes. Forms: hard power (military, economic coercion), soft power (culture, values, diplomacy), and smart power (combination).
• Polarity — distribution of power: unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity. Changes in polarity signal emergence of new centres.
• Hegemony — dominant state or bloc that sets rules; its decline or challenge opens space for new centres.
• Interdependence — mutual economic, political and social links that change how power operates (less direct coercion, more networked influence).
• Transnational actors — corporations, NGOs, networks and institutions that act across borders and can be new centres of influence.

Theoretical frameworks (brief):

• Realism / Neorealism: States seek power or security in an anarchic system. Explains competition among great powers and the balance of power. Useful for explaining military buildups and rivalry (e.g., US–China strategic competition).
• Liberalism / Neoliberal institutionalism: Cooperation through institutions, trade and law reduces conflict; institutions shape how rising powers integrate (e.g., WTO, IMF reforms; BRICS Bank).
• Constructivism: Norms, identities and ideas shape who becomes influential; soft power and normative leadership matter (e.g., EU as normative power).
• Power Transition Theory: Major war risk increases when a rising power’s capabilities approach the dominant power’s — explains tensions during power shifts.
• Hegemonic Stability Theory: A stable international order requires a hegemon; decline of a hegemon can create volatility and opportunities for new centres.
• Complex Interdependence / Network Theory: Multiple channels link societies (trade, finance, information); non-state actors and networks can form new centres of influence (TNCs, tech platforms).
• World-systems theory: Economic core–periphery relations explain structural shifts and the rise of semi-peripheral powers (useful for long-term economic analyses).

Applying frameworks to "new centres of power":

• Use realism and power-transition ideas to analyse strategic rivalry (e.g., China’s military modernisation vs US presence).
• Use liberal institutionalism to study how new actors (BRICS, regional organisations) create alternative institutions (e.g., New Development Bank).
• Use constructivism to explain how normative attraction (culture, governance model) boosts influence (e.g., EU human-rights diplomacy, India’s cultural diplomacy).
• Use network/complex interdependence frameworks to understand influence of TNCs, digital platforms and global supply chains that act like new centres of power.

Measurement and indicators: Analysts combine economic size (GDP, GDP PPP), military spending, technological capability, demographic weight, institutional reach and soft-power metrics to identify emerging centres. No single measure suffices; mixed indices and trend analysis are used.

Limitations: Each theory explains parts of reality. A synthesis—mixing material capability measures, institutional analysis and ideas/norms—is best for understanding contemporary shifts.

Fig 10 — Educational Diagram: Case studies and examples

What this topic covers

Case studies and examples illustrate how 'new centres of power' emerge, how they exercise influence and how global politics changes as a result. They provide concrete evidence of theoretical ideas such as shifting balance of economic and military strength, regional leadership, soft power, and multilateral bargaining.

How to approach case studies

• Identify the actor (state/regional group/non-state actor).
• Describe the source(s) of power (economic growth, military capability, diplomacy, technology, culture).
• Explain actions taken (policies, initiatives, alliances) and immediate outcomes.
• Analyse wider implications for global order, institutions and other states.

Short analytical framework (useful for answers)

Context → Sources of power → Actions/Policies → Outcomes → Significance for global politics.

Representative case studies

• China: rapid economic growth, military modernization and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as instruments of influence across Asia, Africa and Europe.
• BRICS: collective effort by emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) to increase voice in global governance and create alternative institutions (New Development Bank).
• European Union: example of pooled sovereignty and normative power, using economic integration, regulatory standards and enlargement to shape neighbouring states.
• Russia: use of energy exports and military intervention to project regional power (e.g., Ukraine/Crimea 2014) and to challenge Western policies.
• India: growing regional influence through economic partnerships, Act East policy, neighbourhood diplomacy and soft power (culture, diaspora).
• ASEAN: regional organisation that manages regional security and economic cooperation through norms of consultation and consensus, showing how regional centres can stabilise their regions.
• Non-state and transnational actors: multinational corporations and tech firms (example: influence of US and Chinese tech firms on global data flows and standards) and international financial institutions shaping policy through conditionality.